I was in Somalia as a member of the Army's 10th Mountain Division and bar none, I can't imagine any book that could be better written about the situation in Somalia in 1993 than this one. I've bought copies for everyone in my family because by reading it, they will know what I went through.
"Blackhawk Down" was brilliantly done, but it was only about a 2 day battle in Mogadishu in October, 1993. "Doorway To Hell" is about the whole operation and it is so accurate, I had flashbacks when I read about the horrific conditions which I lived through.
It is a book that will be appreciated especially by anyone who was in country, and will be hated by those who made the policy decisions that caused the U.S. to be there in the first place.
I was especially impressed by the breadth and scope of the narrative. It ranges from the policies in the United Nations, White House and Pentagon regarding Somalia; to the experiences of the common soldier who went head to head with Somalian warlord gunmen.
Brigadier General Wheeler and LTC Roberts have done a great service to every one of the 80,000 American veterans who served there and each one of them should get a copy of this book.

This is a book that should be read by everyone in a policymaking position in Washington down to a Marine or soldier in a frontline unit. It covers the Somalia operation from the strategic to the tactical to the impact on the individual. The reader will have a hard time putting this down and there will be times when reading it, the reader will be angry at the incompetence of decisionmakers, sad to the point of tears with regard to the horror and heartache that our troops were exposed to, and extremely proud of the work that our American soldiers and Marines did to help save a starving nation. I am buying copies of this book for presents but only for those who are intelligent enough to understand how complex and challenging was Somalia.

General Wheeler and Colonel Roberts have put together a blockbuster that exposes what happens when US troops are placed under United Nations command (foreign officers), and are subject to ill-defined missions then progress in "mission creep" to such fiascos as depicted in the movie "Blackhawk Down." More importantly, they show the REAL reasons our troops were sent to Somalia that include the economic (oil) and strategic (Somalia guards the entrance to the Red Sea and is across from Yemen). One also finds that Osama bin Ladin's "al Qaida" is responsible for training and equpping the Somalis, and still exist there in training camps on the Horn of Africa. A must read, before it's too late and we end up in another quagmire like this one.

I think this book is a real reference of Somalis existing problem, it tells how the problem was started and which ways it can be overcome and I believe the author is a very bright and intellegent man who is understanding the Somalis prolonged problems and I would like to thank him his outstanding views. Thank you very much indeed for your contribution.

Covering the whole subject about the Somali dilemma. A point which has been ignored for long time. Colonial impact is still the impact of the dilemma. What is happening is just an extention of the problem.

Rarely a book can cover everthing. This is truely a great work which took me three years to prepare. An indispensible material for Horn of Africa students and scholars.

A fantastic true story that has exposed the UN for there own incompetence and corruption. This is not a political book, but one of fact, and of sorrow. Once you pick this book up you will not want to put it down. The central character of the book is a real life entrupener David Morris and what an unbeleivable character he is, what he acheived in Somalia on just a few hundred thousnd dollars, put to shame the UN who spent over 1 billion dollars. This book should be a major motion picture, but I suspect the UN would never allow it to happen.

"Blood Money" is a tragic example of how, as the old saying goes, "the road to Hell is paved with good intentions." New Zealander David Morris went to Somalia with the idea of making some money as a contractor for the U.N. as the U.N. tried to save the country from starvation and anarchy. While the U.N. fed the people, Morris's company fed the U.N. As chronicled by fellow countryman and reporter Trisha Stratford, somewhere along the way Morris decided to do what he could to help the Somali people. For his trouble and due in part to U.N. bungling, he ended up dead. In the context of the greater disaster that was the U.N. mission to Somalia, Morris's death might seem only a small part. But the trouble he and his company had with the World body are lessons that need to be learned if the U.N. is ever going to be an effective force for international intervention. This book is an excellent journalistic account of bureaucratic failure.

This book provides a convincing review of the history of Italian colonialism in the Horn of Africa in general and in Somalia in particular. Specific attention is then paid to the Fiduciary Administration of the 50s, the prelude to an independent Somalia. It provides an interesting insight of the challenges and difficulties that Italy shared in recent international operations and a cold look at recent responsibilities in the collapse of a state.Well written, informative, well documented. A pleasure to read.

As asomali living in Europe this book bringing the real history of world invaision to my country

Mission Improbable gives a very accurate and comprehensive history of the UN operation in Somalia from the historical, political, operational, bureaucratic and personal levels. It describes the anguish of a people struggling to cope both with their own fragmented leadership and with an alien monolith, represented by UNOSOM, in their midst.

The book details the minutiae of a UN bureaucracy at its best and at its worst. On the one hand, it shows how a group of dedicated people representing virtually every culture from around the world can establish themselves in a particularly harsh and dangerous environment, risking their lives to help a desperately needy country get back on its feet and restore its social, economic and political infrastructure.

On the other hand, it demonstrates the ill-preparedness of the Organization, as a reflection of the ill-preparedness of its member state components, to truly understand and to effectively deal with the unique Somalian culture whose goals were essentially parallel to, if not identical with, the UNOSOM mission.

The book touches repeatedly upon the day-to-day frustrations of a transplanted UN bureaucracy, including the furiously circuitous paths that must be taken to get seemingly simple things accomplished, from procuring toilet paper for personal use to trying to explain the whereabouts of a suddenly missing $4 million in cash.

The author explains the conflicts between the age-old Somali clan system, the glue that holds the Somali people together, and the upstart international presence. Most importantly, she explains that this was the fundamental reason behind the inability of the two cultures to communicate meaningfully with one another and which led to the collapse of the international effort to resolve the problem. Nevertheless, as is repeatedly intimated, the Somali people represented by the opposing factions and left to their own devices, are making headway in the formation of a new government which will bring an end to their years of misery.

Overall, this book provides an absolutely unique insight into the UN operation in Somalia and serves to place in a remarkable light the peace that the Somalis are trying to achieve after an important jump-start from the United Nations.

The author's experience as an information officer with the United nations Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM) provides accurate information for the public on the achievement of the UN/US intervention in Somalia. Her narrative puts the record straight by correcting sensational and incomplete international media reports which helped create the impression that the intervention was a failure. With numerous examples such as the prevention of famine, the checking of cholera, the development of markets, the promotion of cattle and fruit exports and the non-retrogression into total anarchy when the UN pulled in March 1995, Fogarassy points out that these significant developments were ignored by the international media because they lacked commercial newsworthiness.

By introducing a Media Unit as part of its operation in Somalia, the UN was capable of more effective communication with the Somalis by radio and print. The services of the Media Unit were invaluable in assisting the Somali reconciliation meetings in Kismayo, Mogadishu and Nairobi. Additionally, the Media Unit complemented the operations of other UNOSOM departments (Justice, Political, Humanitarian and Disarmament, Demining and Demobilisation), as well as those of other international organisations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

The UNOSOM operation highlighted a number of shortcomings in the UN's efficiency in managing field operations needing review, including in recruitment, management and control. Frequent changes in top management undercut mutual trust between Somalis and the international community while disruptive rivalries between the Media Unit chief and the spokesman led to dysfunction in processing and distribution of information, one reason for the international media not obtaining wider coverage of UNOSOM activities.

The UNOSOM compound facilitated the harmonious co-existence of people from diverse cultures, who realised that racial and cultural stereotyping masked much in common to all societies regardless of religion, race or culture. This awareness helped to appreciate that adversarial politics and political party organisations, the basis of democratic systems in western society, are not readily applicable to the Somali context where individualism and communalism are the norms, with decisions reached after extensive consultations among clans and factions. The international community found it convenient to look to Aidid and Ali Mahdi, the principle leaders of two main groups of clan and factional alliances, and they held these two responsible for agreements entered into on behalf of their allies. It was not appreciated that both leaders had very lax disciplinary power over their allies, unlike in a traditional developed country political party organisation. By the same token, the international community, especially the US, was impatient with the long Somali process of consultations and hence, the premature abandonment of the Mission when dividends from the intervention were yielding fruit.

One important lesson from the Somalia operation was that treating the host country with condescension prevented the international community from understanding the Somali psyche. It hindered a faster rate of progress in the restoration of peace and stability. Using utilitarian instruments of incentives and sanctions to achieve goals was counter-productive, yet when funds and facilities for reconciliation meetings were offered, a number of initiatives for reconciliations emerged. Reconciliation that could have led to the formation of a national government was slowed by the Somalis trying to settle historically outstanding clan differences that ranked higher in their priorities.

This book is a didactic source of information on what transpired in Somalia. It makes the case that the intervention was successful and it appeals for a tapping of the UN's extensive facilities for information the commercial media can use.

this is a hasty review. If you want to know about life in very hard places and times where people live constantly on the border beetween life and death and to undersand how people survive, love, live and die in such places then read this book.

Though describing a bygone era in Somalia, this book has few peers when it comes to giving an up-close-and-personal view of the Somalis. Anyone wishing to understand how the US and United Nations came to get so mired in this Horn of Africa country should read this book--and note the lessons that that were never learned before the 1992-1993 humanitarian and military intervention there.

the book describes an event in the canadian military history while operating for the UN in Somalia. First the situation is depicted under which operations took place, then the culture of the unit was investigated and described. Reason because this military culture could perhaps be seen as a reason for the breakdown of discipline in Somalia. This proved to be correct.

I am one of the authors of this book, which was published 12 months ago. I haven't been sent one single copy of the book yet, and the publisher does not reply to faxes or e-mails...

So I guess the book is good, but this has to be a guess!

Fancy being the author of an article and not being able to read it in printed form because of the publisher...!

Let me start this review by confessing that I am biased. One of my letters from Vietnam is included in the book. I therefore view the book differently from the average reader.

I also got an advance copy of the book a week before the official release date, and have been able to read it.

Andrew Carroll produced this book by reading through almost 50,000 letters and selected roughly 200 that best show what everyday life in the military - and in war - are like from the viewpoint of the average soldier, sailor, marine, and airman.

Andy was able to get these letters by persuading Dear Abby to publish an appeal in her column on Veteran's Day in 1998. The column urged readers to contribute these letters so that the sacrifices of the writers would not be forgotten. The result was a flood of 50,000 letters - some faded, some muddy, some blood-stained, and one pierced by a bullet. One letter was written on Hitler's personal stationary by an American sergeant who worked in Hitler's personal quarters in Germany just after WW II. What could be a better symbol of justice?

The letter writers' views are very different than the views you will get by reading the memoirs of a general or an admiral. When I was in the Army, there was a wonderful comment that explained life in the Infantry:

"The general gets the glory, The family gets the body, and We get another mission."

Your view of the military - and of war - changes depending on your position in this food chain.

Overcoming an enemy machine gun is an interesting technical problem when you are circling a firefight in a helicopter at 1,000 feet. You take a very different view of the problem when you are so close to the machine gun that your body pulses from the shock wave of the muzzle blast.

These letters were written by soldiers while they were in the military. They are describing events that happened that day, the pervious day, or the previous week. Their memories are very fresh. Their views also are very different from the views that someone might have when writing his memoirs thirty years later. In thirty years the everyday pains, problems, and terrors could very well be forgotten or become humorous.

The book groups these letters by war or police action. There are sections for letters from the Civil War, WW I (the war to end wars), WW II, Vietnam War, Desert Storm, and Somolia/Bosnia/Kosovo.

Some things never change. The Civil War letter writers grumble about poor food, tiresome marches, mindless sergeants and incompetent officers. The Vietnam letter writers (myself included) grumbled about the same things.

One anguished letter was from an officer in Vietnam who was torn by his need to hide his opposition to the war for fear of demoralizing his men. At the end of the letter is a brief comment explaining that the officer stepped on a mine and died shortly after writing this letter.

Welcome to life in the military. Welcome to war.

You should read this book if you want to see what life was like and is like in the military and in war.

Let me start this review by confessing that I am biased. One of my letters from Vietnam is included in the book. I therefore view the book differently from the average reader.

I also got an advance copy of the book a week before the official release date, and have been able to read it.

Andrew Carroll produced this book by reading through almost 50,000 letters and selected roughly 200 that best show what everyday life in the military - and in war - are like from the viewpoint of the average soldier, sailor, marine, and airman.

Andy was able to get these letters by persuading Dear Abby to publish an appeal in her column on Veteran's Day in 1998. The column urged readers to contribute these letters so that the sacrifices of the writers would not be forgotten. The result was a flood of 50,000 letters - some faded, some muddy, some blood-stained, and one pierced by a bullet. One letter was written on Hitler's personal stationary by an American sergeant who worked in Hitler's personal quarters in Germany just after WW II. What could be a better symbol of justice?

The letter writers' views are very different than the views you will get by reading the memoirs of a general or an admiral. When I was in the Army, there was a wonderful comment that explained life in the Infantry:

"The general gets the glory, The family gets the body, and We get another mission."

Your view of the military - and of war - changes depending on your position in this food chain.

Overcoming an enemy machine gun is an interesting technical problem when you are circling a firefight in a helicopter at 1,000 feet. You take a very different view of the problem when you are so close to the machine gun that your body pulses from the shock wave of the muzzle blast.

These letters were written by soldiers while they were in the military. They are describing events that happened that day, the pervious day, or the previous week. Their memories are very fresh. Their views also are very different from the views that someone might have when writing his memoirs thirty years later. In thirty years the everyday pains, problems, and terrors could very well be forgotten or become humorous.

The book groups these letters by war or police action. There are sections for letters from the Civil War, WW I (the war to end wars), WW II, Vietnam War, Desert Storm, and Somolia/Bosnia/Kosovo.

Some things never change. The Civil War letter writers grumble about poor food, tiresome marches, mindless sergeants and incompetent officers. The Vietnam letter writers (myself included) grumbled about the same things.

One anguished letter was from an officer in Vietnam who was torn by his need to hide his opposition to the war for fear of demoralizing his men. At the end of the letter is a brief comment explaining that the officer stepped on a mine and died shortly after writing this letter.

Welcome to life in the military. Welcome to war.

You should read this book if you want to see what life was like and is like in the military and in war.

This book, War Letters: Extraordinary Correspondence from American Wars, by Andrew Carroll (Editor) is a touching book. With the recent release of the movie Pearl Harbor, the questions that my generation wants to ask the veterans of war are rising out of the ashes once again. Carroll did an excellent job of putting together a collage of soldier's letters which portrays the true emotions of our freedom fighters. Recently having studied many of the wars included in this book, War Letters pulled everything into one book; from the Civil War all the way through Bosnia/Kosovo. The letters in WWI and WWII seemed more hopeful, and 'the great generation' seemed more patriotic. While the soldiers fighting Vietnam had more of a sense of urgency, kind of 'get this over with already' attitude. A common theme with all the letters was they were writing to loved ones, and would claim they would see them soon. Unfortunately, many of these letters were the 'last letters' to the families, some even written on backs of photographs, on scratch paper, or on Hitler's personal stationary. Also, these letters are written a few hours, days, or weeks after the events happened. The soldier has no opportunity to hear what the media said, or how the nation reacted to such a horrific event. They write with their souls, spilling their guts to their families, and shedding their blood for their nation. Granted, having just completed one year of US History helps me understand these events just that much more, but all in all, this book was everything from terrifying to heart warming.

I have six years experience in the U.S. Army, in light infantry, special forces and as a linguist (translating Haitian Creole, amongst other languages). I have worked with and flown in most of the helicopters mentioned in Falcon Brigade. Col. (ret) Casper did an excellent job discussing attack helicopter fire support to MOUT and staff operations for a joint/multinational task force. I especially liked his discussion of using hand-drawn sketches of the cityscape for controlling close air support and the use of snipers in helicopters for counter battery fire against mortars and his account of flag- and cabinet-level politics.

However, although quite a bit could have changed between 1992, when the events in Falcon Brigade occurred, and 1995, when I joined, it seemed obvious that Col. Casper was "not read in" (one of Col. Casper's favorite turns of phrase in this book) to special operations: his familiarity extended only as far as necessary for him to provide helicopter support. For example, his few references to SOF in Haiti usually evolve around his use of his helicopters for their re-supply. The further you get from the helicopter, the more sketchy his knowledge becomes: on pg 35 he claims soldiers are "attached" to the rope when fast roping. As someone who has fast roped, I can tell you that there was nothing attaching me to the rope except my steely grip. (although fast roping is done from a helicopter, these were SOAR helicopters and not under Col. Casper's control)

I enjoyed Col. Casper's discussion of clan geopolitics in Somalia. On the U.S. side, he does show insight (but does not elaborate) into U.S. foreign policy as far as it relates to the role of the U.S. military at the flag officer and cabinet level. The description of garrison life was also interesting. It seemed that Col. Casper had a few axes to grind with some of the generals who (mis)managed the campaign in Somalia. Unlike SOF and ground combat, Col. Casper seemed well acquainted with problems at the flag level. I just wish that he hadn't pulled his punches the way I have a feeling that he did.

I was put off, though, by Col. Casper's annoying use of the word 'crony.' According to Col. Casper, the "Crony" clan must be the largest and most prestigious clan in Somalia: every important Somali in the book is surrounded by Cronies. Why is it that Americans have assistants, aides, XO's, etc., but Somalis only have cronies? And, why is it wrong for Somalis to get through battle chewing khat, but not wrong for Rangers to get through battle chewing Skoal? Why the double standard?

Unfortunately, Col. Casper's description of Haiti and the Haitian people was rather ignorant. The Crony clan seems to be equally widespread and well placed in Haiti: every Haitian leader has the perequisite entourage of cronies. I'd really like to get 'read in' to this Crony clan! Then, on pg 201 he claims Port-au-Prince is a city of 1 million, but on pg 208 the population suddenly grows to 2 million. Either Port-au-Prince experienced some pretty intense activity nine months previously, or there is a mistake here.

His description of Voodoo on page 209 shows the typical American condescension for this religion. Why is Catholicism capitalized but "voodoo" is in lower case? Why is Catholicism acknowledged as a religion but Voodoo is just "magic"? Why do Catholics pray and Voodoo adherents 'cast spells'? Contrary to his claim that Voodoo lacks theology or clergy, Voodoo has a very well developed pantheon (the Loas) and clergy (the Hougans). Then, on page 221, Col. Casper claims that clairin, an alcoholic beverage, is the national drink and the 'sole pleasure' of the Haitian peasant's life. This is a rather skewed and unwarranted representation of the Haitian peasant. Why the double standard? I believe American per capita consumption of beer is far greated that Haitian per capita consumption of clairin, but I would certainly object to America being characterized as a nation of beer-swillers. If we are to believe Col. Casper, then it may have been a hiccup in the clairin supply that led to the sudden increase in population noted above.

On a more serious note, I believe that, regardless of military might, any U.S. peace keeping operation is doomed to failure unless Americans acquire a knowledge of the local people beyond the bare minimum necessary for combat operations. If we knew the people better we probably wouldn't have to fight them. As Col. Casper noted, U.A.E. had good rapport with locals and were able to accomplish the same tasks that severely tasked American military ability peacefully. Col. Casper's stereotypes of Somalis and Haitians as of khat-chewing, clairin-drinking, spell-casting, cronies will not help to establish that rapport.

Seeing as this book is entitled 'Falcon Brigade: Combat and Command in Somalia and Haiti,' I expected a balanced account of the U.S. involvement in Haiti (and Somalia) tempered by Col. Casper's personal experiences. Unfortunately, the account was largely about helicopters and I didn't find a lot of detail on Somalia or Haiti beyond what was visible from the door of Col. Casper's hooch or through NVGs from Col. Casper's cockpit at night. If you can't get enough 'Black Hawk Down' and are already 'read in' to the special forces portion, this may be the book for you. Stylistically, this is an enjoyable page turner with little complexity to slow you down. However, if you want true grit on the situation in Haiti or Somalia, this book may be somewhat of a pricey disappointment.

When we were at Ft Ord with the 7th Infantry Division and
D Company, 7th Combat Aviation Battalion, from 1981 through 1984.

Colonel Casper was a consumate leader in all regards, and if I had a chance to serve with him again, I would not hesitate one moment.

This is an outstanding book to have in one's library if you have an interest on American military involvements. COL Casper book is well written and you get to see the picture of what happened not only from a soldiers perspective but from a BRIGADE COMMANDERS view. A must for any soldier or military historian.